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Abstract. This paper explores a dynamic two-country model with production externalities
in which capital goods are not traded and international lending and borrowing are allowed.
Unlike the integrated world economy model based on the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, our model
yields indeterniinacy of equilibrium under a wider set of parameter values than in the cor-
responding closed economy model. Our finding demonstrates that the assumption on trade
structure would be a relevant determinant in considering the relation between globalization
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1 Introduction
The relation between globalization and economic volatility has been one of the major research
concerns in the field of international macroeconomics. So far, the theoretical as well as
empirical studies have shown diverse conclusions: internationalization of an economy may or
may not enhance economic volatility. Even though we restrict our attention to the equilibrium
business cycle theory based on indeterminacy and sunspots, we find that the theory has
presented two different results. On the one hand, several authors such as Meng (2003),
Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) and Weder (2001) show that small-open economies with
lWe are grateful to Costas Azariadis, Jun-ichi Fujimoto, Shin-ichi Fukuda, Koici Futagami, Volker $B\ddot{o}h_{l}n$ ,
Masaya Sakuragawa, Noritaka Kudoh, Esturo Shioji, Makoto Saito, Akihisa Shibata, Yi-Chan Tsai and Ping
Wang for their helpful comnients on earlier versions of this paper. Our research has been financially supported
by the Gralit-in-Aid for Scientific Research.
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production externalities produce indeterminacy of equilibrium under a wider set of parameter
values than in the corresponding closed economy model. Hence, according to these studies,
globalization of an economy may increase economic volatility.2 Nishimura and Shilnomura
(2002), on the other hand, demonstrate that a world econolny consisting of two sylnmetric
countries with production externalities holds the same stability conditions as those for a closed
economy counterpart. In addition, Sim and Ho (2007) find that if one of the two counties
has no production externalities in Nishimura and Shimomura‘s model, then the equilibrium
path of the world economy would be determinate even though the country with production
externalities exhibits autarkic indeterminacy. These studies indicate that globalization does
not necessarily enhance economic fluctuations.
The opposite results shown above seemingly stem from the difference in the analytical
frameworks used by the foregoing studies. The small-open economy models are based on the
partial equilibrium analysis in which behavior of the rest of the world is exogenously given. In
contrast, the models of world economy employ the general equilibrium approach that treats
the world economic system as a closed economy consisting of multiple countries. The world
economy models thus consider more complex interdependency between the countries than
that assumed in the small-open economy models. One may conjecture that such a difference
would generate the contrasting views as to the destabilizing effect of globalization.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal that the difference in conclusions mentioned above
mainly comes from the assumptions on trade structures rather than from the modelling
strategies. To confirm this fact, we introduce non-traded goods and financial capital mobility
into the model studied by Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) (in what follows, we call it the
NS model). The NS model employs the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework where both
investment and consumption goods are freely traded but there is no intertemporal trade
between the two countries. We assume that consumption goods are internationally traded
but investment goods are non-tradables. We also assume that international lending and
borrowing are possible. Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, in the presence of non-traded
2Lahiri (2001) also examines indeterminacy in a small-open econoniy model. Since he uses a framework
different from the one used by Meng (2003) and others, his model needs a relatively high degree of external
increasing returns to yield indeterminacy. Yong and Meng (2004) and Zhang (2008) also discuss equilibrium
indeterminacy in small-open economies.
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investment goods, the factor price equalization fails to hold in our model. As a result, in
our modified framework the relative price between consumption and investment goods in the
home country may diverge from that in the foreign country at least out of the steady state.
This means that the dynamic behavior of our model out of the steady state will not be the
same as that of a corresponding closed economy. Such a difference in transition dynamics
generates the divergence of deterlninacy conditions between the closed economy and the
integrated world economy with symmetric countries.
Our main finding is that the equilibrium indeterminacy conditions for the world econ-
omy with non-traded investment goods and financial transactions are siinilar to the stability
conditions for the small-open economy models that have the same trade structure. More
specifically, we show that our model may exhibit indeterminacy regardless of the restrictions
on the preference structure. The closed-economy version of our model, which is essentially the
same as the NS model, needs a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption to
hold indeterminacy. Our study, therefore, demonstrates that even tliough the countries in the
world economy have identical technologies and preferences, the presence of non-traded invest-
ment goods and financial capital mobility would generate a divergence in dynamic behavior
of the integrated world economy and a closed, single country. In this sense, the structure of
international trade would be a relevant determinant for the relation between globalization
and volatility.
2 Model
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, home and foreign. Both countries
have the same production technologies. In each country there is a continuum of identical,
infinitely-lived households. All the agents in both countries have an identical time discount
rate and the same form of instantaneous felicity function. The only difference between the
two countries is the initial stock of wealth held by the households in each country.
2.1 Production
The home country has two production sectors. The first sector $(i=1)$ produces investment
goods and the second sector $(i\simeq 2)$ produces pure consumption goods. The production
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function of i-th sector is specified as
$Y_{i}=A_{i}K_{i}^{a_{1}}L_{1}^{b_{i}}X_{i}^{-}$ , $a_{\dot{\eta}}>0,$ $b_{i}>0$ , $0<a_{i}+b_{i}<1$ , $i=1,2$
where $Y_{i},$ $K_{i}$ and $L_{i}$ are i-th sector’s output, capital and labor input, respectively. Here, $\overline{X}_{1}$
denotes the sector and country-specific production externalities. We define:
$\overline{X}_{i}=K_{i}^{\alpha_{1}-a}-$‘ $\overline{L}_{i}^{1-a_{i}-b_{i}}$ , $0_{\dot{\eta}}<\alpha_{i}<1$ , $1-a_{i}>b_{i}$ $i=1,2$ .
If we normalizes the number of producers to one, then it holds that $\overline{K}_{i}=K_{i}$ and $\overline{L}_{i}=$
$L_{i}(i=1,2)$ in equilibrium. This means that the i-th sector’s social production technology
that internalizes the external effects is:
$Y_{i}=A_{i}K_{i}^{\alpha i}L_{i}^{1-\alpha}i$ , $i=1,2$ . (1)
Hence, the social technology satisfies constant returns to scale, while the private technology
exhibits decreasing returns to scale.3
The factor and product markets are competitive, so that the private marginal product
of each production factor equals its real factor price. These conditions are given by the
following:
$r=pa_{1} \frac{Y_{1}}{K_{1}}=a_{2}\frac{Y_{2}}{K_{2}}$ , (2a)
$w=pb_{1} \frac{Y_{1}}{L_{1}}=b_{2}\frac{Y_{2}}{L_{2}}$ , (2b)
where $w$ is the real wage rate, $r$ is the rental rate of capital and $p$ denotes the price of
investment good in terms of the consumption good. The production tecbnologies of the
foreign country are the same as these of the home country where variables with an asterisk
denote foreign variables.
2.2 Households
We assume that the households in the home country access the international financial market
where foreign bonds are freely traded. By trading bonds, the households in the home country
3This specification of production technology was first introduced by Behbhabib and Nishimura (1998).
Benhabib et al. (2000), Meng (2003), Meng and Vela.qco (2003, 2004), Mino (2001) and Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002) utilize the same functional forms.
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can borrow from or lend to the foreign households. The representative household in the home
country maximizes
$U=l_{0}^{\infty} \frac{C^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma}e^{-\rho t}dt$ , $\sigma>0$ , $\rho>0$
subject to the flow budget constraint
$\dot{\Omega}=R\Omega+w+\pi_{1}+\pi_{2}-C$, (3)
together with the no-Ponzi-game condition
$\lim_{tarrow\infty}\exp(-./0^{t_{R_{s}ds)\Omega_{t}}}\geq 0$
and the initial value of $\Omega_{0}$ . In the above, $C$ is consumption, $R$ denotes interest rate, $\pi_{i}$ is the
excess profits in the i-th sector4 and $\Omega$ is the net wealth (in terms of the consumption goods).
The net wealth of held by the household consists of domestic capital and foreign bonds:
$\Omega=pK+B$ ,
where $B$ denotes the stock of foreign bonds (in terms of the consumption goods). When select-
ing its optimal consumption plan, the household take the sequences of $\{R_{t}, w_{t}, \pi_{1,t}, \pi_{2,t},p_{t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$
as given.
The definition of net wealth yields $\dot{\Omega}=p\dot{K}+\dot{p}K+\dot{B}$ . Thus, the flow budget constraint
(3) can be rewritten as
$\dot{B}=RB+(R-\frac{\dot{p}}{p})pK+w+\pi_{1}+\pi_{2}-C-p\mathscr{K}$ .
We also assume that the financial markets are perfect in the sense that domestic capital and
foreign bonds are perfectly substitute each other. This means that arbitrage is excluded in
each moment, so that the net rate of return to capital equals the real interest on bonds:
$\frac{r}{p}-\delta=R-\frac{\dot{p}}{p}$ , (4)
where $\delta\in[0,1)$ denotes the rate of capital depreciation. As a consequence, the optimization
problem for the representative household in the home country is to maximize $U$ by controlling
$C$ and $I$ subject to the following constraints:
$\dot{B}=RB+rK+w+\pi_{1}+\pi_{2}$ – $C$ - $pl$ , (5)
4Remember that the private technology exhinits decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital and
labor.
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$\mathscr{K}=I-\delta K$ , (6)
together with the initial holdings of $K_{0}$ and $B_{0}$ . In this reformulation, the no-Ponzi-galne
condition is given by
$\lim_{tarrow\infty}\exp(-\int_{0}^{t}R_{s}ds)B_{t}\geq 0$. (7)
Set up the Halniltonian function for the optimization problem:
$H= \frac{C^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma}+\lambda[RB+rK+w+\pi_{1}+\pi_{2}-C-pI]+q(I-\delta K)$ ,
where $\lambda$ and $q$ respectively denote the implicit price of the foreign bonds and domestic capital.




$\dot{q}=q(\rho+\delta)-\lambda r=q(\rho+\delta-\frac{r}{p})$ . (8d)
The optimization conditions also involve the transverslity conditions on holding $B$ and $K$ :
$\lim_{tarrow\infty}\lambda e^{-\rho t}B=0$ and $\lim_{tarrow}$oo $qe^{-\rho t}K=0$ .
Since the foreign households have the same preference structure, their optimization con-





It is to be noted that while the interest rate, $R$ , is common for both countries, the real rate of
return to capital in the foreign country, $r^{*}/p^{*}$ , may differ from $r/p$, because in our framework
the factor-price equalization fails to hold out of the steady state.
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2.3 Market Equilibrium Conditions
We assume that consumption goods are internationally traded but investment goods are non-
tradables.5 Although such an assumption is restrictive one, it helps to elucidate the role of
trade structure in a dynamic world economy. Moreover, a large portion of investment goods
$ale$ construction and structures, so that the investment goods sector shares a larger part
of non-tradables than the consumption good sector.6 Since investment goods are traded in
the domestic markets alone and consumption goods are internationally traded, the market
equilibrium conditions for investment and consumption goods are respectively given by
$Y_{1}=I$ , $Y_{1}^{*}=I^{*}$ , (10)
$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}+Y_{2}^{*}=C+C^{*}$ , (11)
where $I$ and $I^{*}$ are gross investment expenditures in the home and foreign countries, respec-
tively. Physical capital in each country accumulates according to
$\mathscr{K}=I-\delta K$ , $\dot{I}C^{*}=I^{*}-\delta K^{*}$ . (12)
As for the factor markets, we follow the standard Heckscher-Ohlin modelling: it is assumed
that capital and labor are perfectly shiftable between the production sectors within a country,
but they cannot move across the borders. Therefore, the full-employlnent conditions for
production factors in each country are the following:
$K=K_{1}+K_{2}$ , $1=L_{1}+L_{2}$ , (13a)
$K^{*}=K_{1}^{*}+K_{2}^{*}$ , $1=L_{1}^{*}+L_{2}^{*}$ . (13b)
We assume that labor supply in each country is fixed and normalized to one.
Finally, the equilibrium condition for the bond market is
$B+B^{*}=0$ ,
5The structure of our model is one of the dependent economy models discussed in open-econoniy macroe-
conomics literature. Turnovsky and Sen (1995) treat a small-open economy model with non-tradable capital
and Turnovsky (1997, Chapter 7) studies a neocla.ssical twocountry, two-sector model in which capital goods
are not traded. Mino (2008) also discusses the similar two-country model with external increasing returns.
See also Chapter 5 in Turnousky (2009) for a brief literature review.
6Bems (2008) finds that the share of investment expenditure on non-traded goods is about 60% and that
this figure has been considerably stable over the last 50 years both in developed and developing countries.
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which means that $\Omega+\Omega^{*}=K+K^{*}$ . Bonds are IOUs between the home and foreign households
and, hence, the aggregate stock of boiids is zero in the world financial market at large.
3 Volatility of the World Economy
3.1 Dynamic System
In equilibrium it holds that $\overline{K}_{2}=K_{i},\overline{L}_{i}=L_{\dot{8}},\overline{I}\prime_{i^{*}}_{e}’=K_{i}^{*}$ and $\overline{L}_{i}^{*}=L_{i}(i=1,2)$ . From $(2a)$ ,
$(2b)$ and the counterparts in the foreign country the factor prices in each country satisfy the
following:
$r=pa_{1}A_{1}k_{1}^{\alpha 1^{-1}}=a_{2}A_{2}k_{2^{2}}^{\alpha-1}$ , (14a)
$w=pb_{1}A_{1}k_{1}^{\alpha_{1}}=b_{2}A_{2}k_{2}^{\alpha 2}$ , (14b)
$r^{*}=p^{*}a_{1}A_{1}k_{1}^{*\alpha_{1}-1}=a2A_{2}k_{2}^{*\alpha 2^{-1}}$ , (14c)
$w^{*}=p^{*}b_{1}A_{1}k_{1}^{*\alpha 1}=b_{2}A_{2}k_{2}^{*\alpha 2}$ , (14d)
where $k_{i}=K_{i}/L_{i}$ and $k_{i}^{*}=K_{i}^{*}/L_{i}^{*}$ $(i=1,2)$ . By use of $(14a),$ $(14b),$ $(14c)$ and $(14d)$ , we
can express the optimal factor intensity in each production sector as a function of relative
price:
$k_{1}=( \frac{A_{1}}{A_{2}})^{\frac{1}{\alpha 2^{-q}1}}(\frac{a_{1}}{a_{2}})^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha 2}\underline{2}_{\overline{\circ}}}1(\frac{b_{1}}{b_{2}})^{\overline{\alpha}-a}1^{-1}2p^{\frac{1}{\alpha-a}}\equiv k_{1}(p)\Phi=$ ,
$k_{1}^{*}=( \frac{A_{1}}{A_{2}})^{\frac{1}{\alpha 2^{-O}1}}(\frac{a_{1}}{a_{2}})^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha 2-}2}\overline{\alpha_{1}}(\frac{b_{1}}{b_{2}})^{\overline{a}_{1}}p^{*\frac{1}{\alpha-\alpha}}\equiv k_{1}(p^{*})aB_{\frac{-1}{-a2}}$ ,
$k_{2}=( \frac{A_{1}}{A_{2}})^{\frac{1}{\alpha 2^{-Q}1}}(\frac{a_{1}}{a_{2}})^{\frac{\alpha_{1}}{\circ 2^{-\alpha}1}}(\frac{b_{1}}{b_{2}})^{\frac{a_{1}-1}{\alpha_{1^{-\circ}2}}}p^{\frac{1}{\alpha 2^{-\alpha}1}}\equiv k_{2}(p)$ ,
$k_{2}^{*}=( \frac{A_{1}}{A_{2}})^{\frac{1}{a-\alpha}}(\frac{a_{1}}{a2})^{\frac{\alpha_{1}}{a-a}}(\frac{b_{1}}{b_{2}})^{\frac{\alpha_{1}-1}{a-a}}p^{*\frac{1}{\alpha 2-\alpha_{1}}}\equiv k_{2}(p^{*})$ .
These expressions show that
sign $k_{i}’(p)=$ sign $k_{i}’(p^{*})=$ sign $(\alpha_{2}-\alpha_{1})$ , $i=1,2$ . (16)
In the above, the sign of $\alpha_{1}-\alpha 2$ represents the factor intensity ranking from the social
perspective. When $\alpha_{1}-\alpha 2$ is positive (negative), the investment good sector is more (less)
capital intensive than the consumption good sector from the social perspective.
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In this paper we restrict our attention to the interior equilibrium in which both countries
imperfectly specialize. To ensure this restriction, we assume that relative price in each country
satisfies the following condition:
$L_{1}= \frac{K-k_{2}(p)}{k_{1}(p)-k_{2}(p)}\in(0,1)$ , $L_{1}^{*}= \frac{K^{*}-k_{2}(p^{*})}{k_{1}(p^{*})-k_{2}(p^{*})}\in(0,1)$ . (17)
Using functions $k_{1}(p)$ and $k_{2}(p)$ , we see that capital accumulation equation in each country
is written as
$\dot{K}=y^{1}(K,p)-\delta K$ , (18a)
$\mathscr{K}^{*}=y^{1}(K^{*},p^{*})-\delta K^{*}$ , (18b)
where $y^{1}(K,p)$ and $y^{1}(K^{*},p^{*})$ express the supply functions of investment goods given by
$y^{1}(K,p) \equiv\frac{K-k_{2}(p)}{k_{1}(p)-k_{2}(p)}A_{1}k_{1}(p)^{\alpha_{1}}$ ,
$y^{1}(K^{*},p^{*}) \equiv\frac{K^{*}-k_{2}(p^{*})}{k_{1}(p^{*})-k_{2}(p^{*})}A_{1}k_{1}(p^{*})^{\alpha_{1}}$ .
It is easy to see that these supply functions satisfy:
sign $y_{K}^{1}(K,p)=$ sign $y_{K}^{1}$ , $(K^{*},p^{*})=$ sign $( \frac{a_{1}}{b_{1}}-\frac{a_{2}}{b_{2}})$ , (19a)
sign $y_{p}^{1}(K,p)=$ sign $y_{p}^{1}$. $(K^{*},p^{*})=$ sign $( \frac{a_{1}}{b_{1}}-\frac{a2}{b_{2}})(\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2})$ . (19b)
Notice that the sign of $\lrcorner_{--}ab_{1}\neq^{a_{2}}$ shows the factor intensity ranking from the private perspective.
The shadow values of capital in both countries change according to
$\dot{q}=q[\rho+\delta-\hat{r}(p)]$ , (20a)
$\dot{q}^{*}=q^{*}[\rho+\delta-\hat{r}(p^{*})]$ , (20b)
where $\hat{r}(p)\equiv r/p=a_{1}A_{1}k_{1}(p)^{\alpha_{1}-1}$ and $\hat{r}(p^{*})\equiv r^{*}/p^{*}=a_{1}A_{1}k_{1}(p^{*})^{\alpha_{1}-1}$ . Dynamic equa-
tions $(18a),$ $(18b),$ $(20a)$ and $(20b)$ depict behaviors of capital stocks and their implicit prices
in the home and foreign countries.
The optimization conditions $(8c)$ and $(9c)$ mean that $\lambda/\lambda^{*}$ stays constant over time and,
therefore, from $(8a)$ and $(9a)$ the relative consumption, $C/C^{*}$ , also stays constant even out
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of the steady state. Let us denote $C^{*}/C=(\lambda^{*}/\lambda)^{-1/\sigma}=$ th $(>0)$ . Then the world $mal\cdot ket$
equilibrium condition for consuxnption goods given by (11) becomes
$(1+m-)\lambda^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}=y^{2}(K,p)+y^{2}(K^{*},p^{*})$ , (21)
where
$y^{2}(K,p)= \frac{k_{1}(p)-K}{k_{1}(p)-k_{2}(p)}A_{2}k_{2}(p)^{\alpha 2}$ ,
$y^{2}(K^{*},p^{*})= \frac{k_{1}(p^{*})-K^{*}}{k_{1}(p^{*})-k_{2}\wedge(p^{*})}A_{2}k_{2}(p^{*})^{\alpha 2}$ .
The supply functions of consumption goods satisfy the following:
sign $y_{K}^{2}(K,p)=$ sign $y_{K}^{2}$. $(K^{*},p^{*})=$ –sign $( \frac{a_{1}}{b_{1}}-\frac{a2}{b_{2}})$ , (22a)
sign $y_{p}^{2}(K,p)=$ sign $y_{p^{*}}^{2}(K^{*},p^{*})=$ –sign $( \frac{a_{1}}{b_{1}}-\frac{a2}{b_{2}})(\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2})$ . (22b)
In view of (21), we see that $\lambda$ is expressed as a function of capital stocks, prices and $\overline{m}$ :
$\lambda$ $=$ $(1+m-)^{\sigma}[y^{2}(K,p)+y^{2}(K^{*},p^{*})]^{-\sigma}$
$\equiv$ $\lambda(K, K^{*},p,p^{*-};m)$ . (23)
Thus optimization conditions $(8b)$ and $(9b)$ yield
$p= \frac{q}{\lambda(K,K^{*},p,p^{*-};m)}$ , $p^{*}= \frac{q^{*}}{\lambda(K,K^{*},p,p^{*}|^{-}m)}$ .
Solving these equations with respect to $p$ and $p^{*}$ presents the following expressions:
$p=\pi(K, K^{*}, q, q^{*-};m)$ , $p^{*}=\pi^{*}(K, K^{*}, q, q^{*};\uparrow\overline{n})$ . (24)
Substituting (24) into $(18a),$ $(18b),$ $(20a)$ and $(20b)$ , we obtain a complete dynamic system
of $K,$ $K^{*},$ $q$ and $q^{*}$ .
3.2 Conditions for Equilibrium Indeterminacy
We first characterize the stationary equilibrium of the world economy. The steady state of
the dynainic system derived above is established when $\dot{K}=\mathscr{K}*=\dot{q}=\dot{q}^{*}=0$ . From (24)
the relative price in the home and foreign countries, $p$ and $p^{*}$ , also stay constant in the
steady-state equilibrium. As for the existence of a feasible steady state, we can confirm the
following:
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Proposition 1 Suppose that both $count\uparrow\dot{v}es$ imperfectly specialize in the steady state. Then
the steady-state values of $K,$ $K^{*},$ $p$ and $p^{*}a\prime e$ uniquely determined. Additionally, if $\overline{m}$ is
fixed, the steady-state levels of $q$ and $q^{*}$ are uniquely given as well.
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
It is worth noting that while the steady-state levels of $K,$ $K^{*},$ $p$ and $p^{8}$ are independent
of $\overline{m}$ , the steady-state values of $q$ and $q^{*}$ depend on $\overline{m}$ . Therefore, the presence of a unique
set of steady state levels of $q$ and $q^{*}$ critically depends upon our assumption that the value
of $\overline{m}$ is exogenously given. To complete our analysis on the steady-state equilibrium, we
should consider how $\overline{m}$ is determined. Before discussing this problem, let us explore the local
determinacy of the steady-state equilibrium under a given level of $\overline{m}$ .
Proposition 2 Under a given level of $\overline{m}$ , the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy
is locally indeterminate, if the investment good sector is more capital intensive than the
consumption good sector from the social perspective but it is less capital intensive from the
private perspective.7
Proof. Omitted. $\blacksquare$
Proposition 2 claims that in our model equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge regardless
of the magnitude of $\sigma$ . This is in contrast to the conclusion of the NS model where, in addi-
tion to the conditions given in Proposition 2, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption, $1/\sigma$ , should be high to hold intermediacy.8 Since the closed economy version
of our model is the same as the NS model, we need the same condition for holding indetermi-
nacy if our model economy is closed. Hence, our result shows that the financially integrated
world with non-tradable capital goods may produce indeterminacy umder a wider range of
parameter spaces than in the closed economy counterpart. In this sense, our model indicates
that globalization may enhance the possibility of sunspot-driven economic fluctuations.9
$\overline{\tau_{We}}$can also show h t, as well as in the NS model, our model holds equilibrium determinacy, if the
$factor-i_{11}te11sity$ rankings are the same both from private and social perspectives.
8More precisely, the indeterminacy conditions in the NS model include the following:
$\frac{1}{\sigma}>\max\{1, \frac{(1-\alpha_{1})a_{2}b_{1}(\rho+\delta)+\alpha_{1}a_{1}[\rho b_{2}+\delta b_{1}a_{2}+(1-a_{1})b_{2}\delta]}{(a_{2}b_{1}-a_{1}b_{2})(\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2})[\rho+\delta(1-a_{1})]}\}$ .
9The indeterminacy conditions in Proposition 2 require that constant returns prevail in each production
sector and that the external effects associated with capital are larger in the investment good sector than in the
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We now consider how to determine $?\overline{n}$ . Using the market equilibrium condition for the
investment goods in (10) and the factor income distribution relation such that $pY_{1}+Y_{2}=$
$rpK+w+\pi_{1}+\pi_{2}$ and $p^{*}Y_{1}^{*}+Y_{2}^{*}=r^{*}p^{*}K^{*}+w^{*}+\pi_{1}^{*}+\pi_{2}^{*}$ , we find that the dynamic equation
of foreign bonds are expressed as
$\dot{B}=RB+Y_{2}-C$ , $\dot{B}^{*}=RB^{*}+Y_{2}^{*}-C^{*}$ .
These equations represent the current accounts of both countries. In view of the no-Ponzi
game and the transversality conditions, the intertemporal constraint for the current account
of each country is respectively given by the following:
$\int_{0}^{\infty}\exp(-./0^{t_{R_{s}ds)C_{t}dt}}=,\int_{0}^{\infty}\exp(-J_{0}^{t}R_{s}ds)y^{2}(K_{t},p_{t})dt+B_{0}$ ,
$/o^{\infty}\exp(-./0^{t}R_{s}ds)C_{t}^{*}dt=J_{0}^{\infty}\exp(-./o^{t}R_{s}ds)y^{2}(K_{t}^{*},p_{t}^{*})dt+B_{0}^{*}$ .
Since it holds that $C_{t}^{*}=\iota\overline{n}C_{t}$ for all $t\geq 0$ , the above equations yield
$\overline{m}=\frac{/_{0}^{\infty}\exp(-.[_{0}{}^{t}R_{s}ds)y^{2}(K_{t}^{*},p_{t}^{*})dt+B_{0}^{*}}{J_{0}^{\infty}\exp(-J_{0}{}^{t}R_{s}ds)y^{2}(K_{t},p_{t})dt+B_{0}}$. (25)
Equation (25) demonstrates that $\overline{m}$ depends on the initial holdings of bonds, $B_{0}$ and $B_{0}^{*}$ ,
as well as on the discounted present value of consumption goods produced in each country. It
is to be noticed that the discounted present values of consumption goods are independent of
$\overline{m}$ . To see this, we differentiate both sides of (23) logarithmically with respect to time, which
yields
$\frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda}=-\sigma[\frac{Y_{K}^{2}K}{Y^{2}}\frac{\mathscr{K}}{K}+\frac{Y_{K^{*}}^{2}K^{*}}{Y^{2}}\frac{\dot{K}^{*}}{K^{*}}+\frac{Y_{p}^{2}p}{Y^{2}}\frac{\dot{p}}{p}+\frac{Y^{2}p^{*}}{Y^{2}}\frac{\dot{p}^{*}}{p^{*}}]$ , (26)
consumption good sector. Several investigations on scale economies have suggested that our indeterminacy
conditions are not unrealistic. For example, the well-cited study by Basu and Fernald (1997) find that most
industries in the US approximately exhibit constant returns to scale, which may support our assumption of
social constant returns. Using the US data, Harrison (2003) claims that returns to scale of the consumption
goods sector are close to be constant, while the investment goods sector exhibits weak increasing returns. In
addition, she reveals that external effects may be larger in the investment good sector than in the consumption
good sector. However, the existing studies do not present direct empirical evidence for our discussion. Since
the indeterminacy conditions in Proposition 2 are frequently used in the literature, it is a relevant task to find
more convincing empirical support.
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where $Y^{2}\equiv y^{2}(K,p)+y^{2}(K^{*},p^{*})$ denotes the aggregate supply of consumption goods in the
world market. Note that from $(8b),$ $(8c),$ $(8d),$ $(9b),$ $(9c)$ and $(9d)$ , we obtain:
$\frac{\dot{p}}{p}=\frac{\dot{q}}{q}-\frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda}=R+\delta-\hat{r}(p)$ , (27a)
$\frac{\dot{p}^{*}}{p^{*}}=\frac{\dot{q}^{*}}{q}*-\frac{\dot{\lambda}^{*}}{\lambda^{*}}=R+\delta-\hat{r}(p^{*})$ . (27b)
Substituting $(18a),$ $(18b),$ $(27a)$ , and $(27b)$ into (26) yields the following:
$\rho-R$ $=$ $- \sigma[\frac{Y_{K}^{2}K}{Y^{2}}(\frac{y^{1}(K,p)-\delta K}{K})+\frac{Y_{K^{*}}^{2}K^{*}}{Y^{2}}(\frac{y^{2}(K^{*},p)-\delta K^{*}}{K^{*}})$
$+ \frac{Y_{p}^{2}p}{Y^{2}}(R+\delta-\hat{r}(p))+\frac{Y_{p^{*}}^{2}p^{*}}{Y^{2}}(R+\delta-\hat{r}(p^{*}))]$ .
Observe that each side of the above equation does not $i_{1}ivolve\overline{m}$ . Solving the above with
respect to $R$ , we find that the equilibrium level of the world interest rate can be expressed as
a function of $K,$ $K^{*},p$ and $p^{*}$ :
$R=R(K, K^{*},p,p^{*})$ . (28)
Consequently, by use of $(18a),$ $(18b),$ $(27a),$ $(27b)$ and (28), we obtain an alternative






From $(8c)$ the steady-state level of interest rate satisfies $R=\rho^{10}$ Since the dynamic system
(29) does not involve $\overline{m}$ , if the steady state is locally determinate (i.e. the linearized dynamic
system has two stable roots), then the equilibrium path of $p_{t}$ and $p_{t}^{*}$ are uniquely expressed as
functions of $K_{t}$ and $K_{t}^{*}$ on the two-dimensional stable manifold. When we denote the relation
between the relative prices and capital stocks on the stable saddle path as $p=\phi(K, K^{*})$ and
$p^{*}=\phi^{*}(K, K^{*})$ , the behaviors of capital stocks on the saddle path are expressed as
$\dot{K}$
$=$ $y^{1}(K, \phi(K, K^{*}))-\delta K$ ,
rc $*$ $=$ $y^{1}(K^{*}, \phi^{*}(K, K^{*}))-\delta K^{*}$ .
$\overline{10_{We}}$can show that dynaniic analysis of (29) presents the same conclusion as that stated in Proposition
2. However, since function (28) is rather complex, stability analysis is more cumbersome than that shown in
Appendix 2.
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These differential equations show that once the initial capital stocks, $K_{0}$ and $K_{0}^{*}$ , are specified,
the paths of $\{K_{t}, K_{t}^{*}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ are uniquely determined. As a result, the paths of $\{p_{t},p_{t}^{*}, R_{t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$
are also uniquely given under the specffied levels of $K_{0}$ and $K_{0}^{*}$ . This means that when
equilibrium determinacy holds, the level of $\overline{m}$ given by (25) is also uniquely selected under
the given initial levels of $K_{0},$ $K_{0}^{*},$ $B_{0}$ and $B_{0}^{*}$ .
In contrast, if the converging path of (29) is indeterminate (that is, the linearly approxi-
mated dynamic system of (29) has three or four stable roots), then the given initial levels of
$K_{0}$ and $K_{0}^{*}$ alone cannot pin down the equilibrium paths of $p_{t}$ and $p:$ . Therefore, the level of
$\overline{m}$ determined by (25) becomes indeterminate as well. In this situation, we should specify ex-
pectations formation of agents to select a particular path leading to the steady state. Once we
specify a particular trajectory of the world economy with self-fulfilling expectations, we can
determine the value of $\overline{m}$ that satisfy (25). However, such an equilibrium path may fluctuate
if a sunspot shock hits the world economy, so that $\uparrow\overline{n}$ is also affected by expecta.tions-driven
fluctuations.
In the steady state it holds that $B=\dot{B}^{*}=0$ and $R=\rho$ . Thus the steady-state level of
bond holdings in both countries are given by
$B= \frac{y^{2}(K,p)-C}{\rho}=\frac{\overline{m}-1}{\rho(1+\overline{n})}y^{2}(K,p)$ , (30a)
$B^{*}= \frac{y^{2}(K,p)-m-C}{\rho}=\frac{1-\overline{m}}{\rho(1+m-)}y^{2}(K,p)$ . (30b)
The above expressions show that when $\overline{m}$ is selected, the long-run asset position of each
country is also determined. It is obvious that whether the home country becomes a creditor
or a debtor in the long run depends solely on whether or not $\uparrow\overline{n}$ exceeds one. As (25)
demonstrates, if the equilibrium path is determinate and if the initial stocks of capital and
bonds held by the home households are relatively large, then the home country tends to be a
creditor in the long-run equilibrium. However, if there is a continuum of covering path around
the steady state, the vaJue of $\overline{m}$ determined by (25) is affected by the expectations formation
of agents. Tliis implies that in the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the initial holding
of wealth in each country does not necessarily determine the asset position of that country
in the long-run equilibrium.
To sum up, we have shown:
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Proposition 3 If the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is locally determinate
(indeterminate), then the steady-state level of asset position of each country is determinate
(indeterminate).
4 Discussion
As emphasized in the previous section, the prominent difference in indeterminacy conditions
between our formulation and the NS model is that our model may produce indeterminacy
regardless of the form of instantaneous utility function, while the NS model need a high elas-
ticity of intertemporal substation in consumption. In this section we consider the key factors
that generate such a difference in indeterminacy conditions. We first summarize dynamic
behavior of the NS model and give an intuitive implication of its indeterminacy conditions.
We then examine the indeterminacy conditions for a small-open economy with non-traded
investment goods and financial capital mobility, which reveals that the indeterminacy condi-
tions for our model ares close to these for the small-open economy. Finally, we explore the
case where consumption goods are non-tradables and investment goods are traded. This con-
sideration demonstrates that the absence of investment goods trade plays a pivotal role for
producing the difference in indeterminacy conditions between our model and the NS model.
4.1 Indeterminacy in the NS Model
In the NS model, both investment and consumption goods are freely traded, but there is no
intertemporal trade.11 Therefore, firms in both countries face a common relative price. This
means that under our assumption of symmetric technologies between the two countries, both
home and foreign firms in each production sector select the same capital intensity as long as
both countries imperfectly specialize. Hence, it holds that $k_{i}(p)=k_{i}^{*}(p)$ $(i=1,2)$ for all
llIf we introduce international lending and borrowing into the NS model, the households’ portfolio choice
between capital and bonds beconies indeterminate. Hence, intertemporal trade is redundant in the NS model
that uses the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework. This $res$ult is a reconfirmation of Munde]’$s$ (1957) well
known finding in the static Heckscher-Ohlin model. As to the discussion of this issue in the dynamic context,
see Claustre and Kehoe (2010) and Cremers (1997). Ono and Shibata (2010) point out that lending and
borrowing can be introduced into the standard dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model if we assume the presence of
investment adjustment costs.
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$t\geq 0$ . Thus the world market equilibrium condition for investment goods, $\mathscr{K}+\delta K+\mathscr{K}*+$
$\delta K^{*}=Y_{1}+Y_{1}^{*}$ , yields the capital formation equation such that
$\mathscr{K}_{w}=\frac{K_{w}-2k_{2}(p)}{k_{1}(p)-k_{2}(p)}-\delta K_{w}$ , (31)
where $K_{w}=K+K^{*}$ denotes the world level of capital stock. In addition, since firms
in both countries choose the same capital intensities, the factor prices are also equalized
between the two countries, that is, $\hat{r}^{*}(p)=\hat{r}(p)$ and $w^{*}(p)=w(p))$ implying that the
dynamic equation of the shadow value of capital in the foreign country $(20b)$ is replaced with
$\dot{q}’=q^{*}(\rho+\delta-\hat{r}(p))$ . Tuss equation $(20a)$ shows that $q^{*}/q$ stays constant over time and
that the complete dynamic system of the world economy is given by $(20a),$ (31) and the world
market equilibrium condition for consumption goods:
$Y_{2}+Y_{2}^{*}=C+C^{*}\Rightarrow(1+m-)q$ $\frac{2k_{1}(p)-K_{w}}{k_{1}(p)-k_{2}(p)}$ , (32)
where $\overline{m}$ is a positive constant defined as $\uparrow\overline{n}=C/C^{*}=(q/q^{*})^{-1/\sigma}$ . Given $\overline{m}$ , the equilibrium
relative price can be expressed as $p=\pi(K_{w}, q;m-)$ . Substituting this function into $(20a)$ and
(31), we obtain a complete dynaxnic system with respect to $K_{w}$ and $q$ . This aggregate dynamic
system is essentially the same as the closed economy model in Benhabib and Nishimura
(1998).12 As a consequence, the intuitive implication of the indeterminacy conditions for the
NS model is the same as that for the case of a closed economy.
Now suppose that the indeterminacy conditions for the NS model are satisfied, that is, $1/\sigma$
has alarge value and the indeterminacy conditions in Proposition 2 hold. Suppose further that
a sunspot shock hits the economy so that agents anticipate the rate of return to capital will
rise. Then the households increase investment to accumulate a larger amount of capital, but
in the absence of international borrowing, they should reduce their current consumption to
raise savings. Since $1/\sigma$ is assumed to be high, the substitution effect dominates the income
effect so that an anticipated rise in the rate of return actually increases the households’
current savings, which leads to a higher level of capital stock. As we have assumed that
12Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) show that the steady-state levels of $K_{w}$ and $p$ are uniquely given. Dis-
tribution of capital stock between the two countries depends on the initial holdings of capital if the equilibrium
path of the world economy is determinate. They also confirm that the long-run distribution of capital (so
the long-run trade patterns) becomes indeterminate, if the steady state of the dynamic system of the world
econolny is a sink.
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the consumption good sector is more capital intensive from tlie private perspective, (17)
shows that an increase in capital stock raises consumption goods production relative to the
investment goods. This increases the price of investment good $p$ , and the firms selects alower
capital intensity because the social technology of the capital goods is more capital intensive
than that of the consumption good sector (see (16)). Consequently, the rate of return to
capital will increase and the sunspot-driven expectations will be self-fulfilled.
4.2 Indeterminacy in the Small-Open Economy
Next, consider a small-open economy that has the same trade structure as ours. Since
the world interest rate is exogenously given for the small country, its dynamic behavior
is described by $(18a)$ and A $=\lambda(\overline{R}-\rho)$ , where $\overline{R}$ is a given world interest rate. The
conventional assumption is that the time discount rate is set to satisfy $\rho=\overline{R}$ to obtain a
feasible steady state, which means that the shadow val$\iota\iota e$ of foreign bonds, $\lambda$ , stays constant
over time. As a reslut, from $(8b)$ the shadow value of capital is proportional to the relative
price even out of the steady state. This means that the price dynamics is given by
$\dot{p}=p(R^{-}+\delta-\hat{r}(p))=p(\rho+\delta-\hat{r}(p))$ . (33)
The complete dynamic system consists of $(18a)$ and (33). It is easy to confirm that the
conditions displayed in Proposition 2 are necessary and sufficient for indeterminacy in the
small-open economy.
Again assume that a sunspot-driven expectation change makes the households raise their
investment. Unlike the NS model, in a small country with financial capital mobility, the house-
holds may rise their investment by borrowing from the foreign households without reducing
current consumption. Therefore, the elasticity intertermporal substitution in consumption
will play no role for equilibrium determinacy/indeterminacy.
It is now obvious that there is a strong similarity between the $dynanc$ behavior of our
model and that of the small-open economy with non-traded investment goods and financial
capital mobility. In fact, if we ignore the foreign country and set $R=\overline{R}$ in (29), then
we obtain a dynamic system in which the home country is assumed to be a small-open
economy. In the general equilibrium model of the world economy, the interest rate, $R$ ,
is an endogenous variable and, hence, the conditions in Proposition 2 are sufficient but not
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necessary for indeterminacy in our model. However, under our assumption that both countries
have the sme technologies and the identical homothetic preferences, the $dyna\iotac$ belabor
of an individual country in the world economy is close to that of the small-open economy at
least near the steady state.
5 A Final Remark
The world economy as a whole is a closed economy in which there are heterogeneous coun-
tries. Therefore, its model structure is similar to that of a closed, single economy model with
heterogeneous agents. In particular, if consumption and saving decisions are made by the
representative household in each country, the world economy model is closely connected to
the closed economy model with heterogeneous households. There is, however, an important
differenoe between the world economy models and the single country setting: when dealing
with the world economy model, we should specify the trade structure between the coun-
tries. This paper has revealed that the assumption on trade structure may be critical for
the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy even if there is no international heterogeneity in
technologies and preferences. Several authors have explored recently how the presence of
heterogeneous preferences and technologies alter the determinacy/indeterminacy conditions
in the equilibrium business cycle models with market distortions. These studies have shown
that the heterogeneity in preferences and technologies often affects stability condition in a
critical manner.13 In a similar vein, Sim and Ho (2007) find that introducing technological
heterogeneity into the NS model may produce a substantial change in equilibrium indeter-
minacy results. Those existing findings suggest that it is worth extending our model by
considering further heterogeneity between the two countries.
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